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The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.
-Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California'
I. INTRODUCTION

What should lawyers do when dealing with an ethical dilemma, requiring a
choice between preserving confidentiality or serving the public interest? Lawyers
owe a duty to their clients2 and a duty to the profession.3 One duty a lawyer owes
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2005; B.A. Political
Science, B.A. Psychology, University of California, San Diego, 2002. I want to thank all those who have
supported me, and provided me with the love necessary to succeed; I appreciate everything you do for me.
1. TARASOFF V. REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CAL., 551 P.2D 334,442 (CAL. 1976).
2. See THE LAW SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS annex 21A, § 2.3,
(1999), available at http://www.guide.lawsociety.org.uk (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (stating that advocates "must promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and
lawful means the client's best interest"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) (noting that
lawyers should zealously represent clients, acting with dedication and commitment to the client); CONSEIL DES
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to his client is the duty of confidentiality, which is the basis of the attorney-client
relationship in most countries,4 and a fundamental principle of the attorney-client
relationship in the United States5 and several other jurisdictions.6 The duty of
confidentiality prohibits an attorney from sharing client information gained
during the attorney client relationship.7 The rationale behind this duty is that it
creates a unique bond between the attorney and client by fostering candid
communications s However, exceptions to the duty of confidentiality are
recognized in the United States and some foreign jurisdictions.9 The most
important exception is when a client is threatening to harm a third party:
Internationally, some jurisdictions recognize the need for an exception to strict
confidentiality when a third party may be harmed. '° In these jurisdictions,
BARREAUX DE LUNION EUROPtENNE [Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE)],

1.1 (1988; last amended Dec. 6, 2002),
available at http://www. ccbe.org/doc/En/code2002_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2003) [hereinafter CCBE
CODE OF CONDUCT] (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer) (stating a lawyer's function includes a
variety of legal and moral obligations towards the client, the courts, and the legal profession in general).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 6 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
pre amble.html (stating that lawyers should "further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of
law and the justice system").
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION §

4. See generally CCBE, THE PROFESSIONAL SECRET, CONFIDENTIALITY AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL
PRIVILEGE IN EUROPE, Update on the Report by D.A.O. Edwards, QC, (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter THE EDWARDS
REPORT], available at http://ccbe.org/doc/En-update-edwardsreport-en.pdf (providing a comparative analysis

of the laws of the European Community Member states with regard to the varying concepts of confidentiality
and privilege). In 1976, the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community
published a report by Mr. D.A.O. Edward, Q.C. of the Scottish Bar, entitled "The Professional Secret,
Confidentiality and Legal Professional Privilege in the Nine Member States of the European Community." Case
155/79, AM & S v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575 at 2 C.M.L.R. 64 (1982). In preparation of the report Mr.
Edward was advised and assisted by distinguished members of the Bars of all countries of the Community. Id.
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003) (describing confidentiality as a
fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship, and therefore in the absence of a client's informed
consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation of the client); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2003) (defining informed consent as the agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate explanation about risks and
alternatives of proposed course of conduct).
6. See R. v. McClure, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, 459 (emphasizing that the unique role of the solicitor who
provides legal advice to clients is necessary to preserve the administration of justice); Smith v. Jones, [1999]
S.C.R. LEXIS 46382, *18 (describing the solicitor client privilege as being of fundamental importance to the
administration of justice). The solicitor client privilege is based on the principle that individuals can confide in
legal professionals knowing what they relay will be kept in confidence. Id.; THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L
CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS 2.3.2 (stating confidentiality is a primary and fundamental right and duty of the
lawyer).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (discussing that the confidentiality rule applies to
matters communicated by the client in confidence, as well as all information relating to the representation,
irregardless of source).
8. Id. at cmt. 2.
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6; THE EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-19 (listing
exceptions to confidentiality and privilege within each jurisdiction).
10. THE EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 13-19 (providing answers to the survey answered by various
countries regarding the role of confidentiality in legal relationships); LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A
COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS APPLICABLE TO THE CROSS-BORDER

PRACTICE OF LAW (Edwin Godfrey, ed., Sterling House Books 1995) [hereinafter LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS]
(discussing the rules of professional ethics applicable to the cross-border practice of law).
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standards differ regarding when it is appropriate to breach attorney-client
confidentiality." In addition, the standards in these foreign jurisdictions also vary
from the standards used for breaching confidentiality in the United States.
This comment compares how the United States and various other countries
deal with the possibility of harm to a third party in the attorney-client context.
Part II provides an overview of the rule relating to confidentiality, as established
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the United States. Furthermore, it
discusses the standard that must be met prior to breaching confidentiality and
illustrates that the problem of a client who may cause harm to a third party is real
in the United States. Part III presents the professional responsibility guides in
foreign jurisdictions, specifically Canada, the European Union, and the United
Kingdom, and illustrates how those nations have developed rules on confidentiality.
In addition, it discusses how those nations determine the appropriate time to
breach confidentiality in an attorney-client relationship. Part IV discusses the
ongoing debate between the proponents and opponents of the duty to disclose
when there is potential harm to a third party. Part V proposes that the best way to
deal with the situation when a client poses harm to a third party is to follow the
Canadian approach, which allows discretionary disclosure of the harm on a caseby-case basis. Thus, the United States should adopt this approach in order to
provide effective guidance for attorneys and ultimately to eliminate the hesitation
of attorneys in breaching confidentiality, helping to prevent injuries to known
potential victims.

11. THE EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-19; see generally CROSS BORDER PRAcTICE
COMPENDIUM (D.M. Donald-Little ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1991) (compiling information and surveys from
various countries on the appropriateness of breaching confidentiality).
12. See THE EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 14-19 (including the limitations on professional secrecy
and penalties for inappropriately breaching confidentiality); see also infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text
(providing a discussion of threshold that must be met to breach confidentiality in Canada); see also infra notes
119-132 and accompanying text (illustrating the expectation of strict confidentiality for lawyers in the European
Union); see generally THE LAW SOCIETY, LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: THE CURRENT POSITION (Sept.
2003), [hereinafter LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)

(discussing the Legal Professional Privilege in the United Kingdom and various other jurisdictions).
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1I. THE UNITED
A.

STATES

Development of the Model Rule Governing Confidentiality3

In 1977, the American Bar Association ("ABA") appointed a committee to
revamp the Model Code 4 of Professional Responsibility. 5 In 1982, the special
committee presented the Revised Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility (Model Rules) to the ABA House of Delegates. 6 This draft was
finally adopted and publicized by the ABA in 1983.7
The adoption of Rule 1.6, which is the rule governing the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality and the exceptions to that duty, was perhaps the most
controversial of the rules recommended by the committee."' The version adopted
in 1983 permitted a lawyer to breach confidentiality when the lawyer reasonably
believed the client was going to commit a crime likely to result in imminent

13. Confidentiality applies to all phases of legal representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
1.6(a). See Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client ConfidentialityNecessary? 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 48593 (providing the history of the ethical rule of confidentiality); see also Nancy J. Moore, Limits To AttorneyClient Confidentiality:A "PhilosophicallyInformed" and ComparativeApproach to Legal and Medical Ethics,
36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177, 199-201 (1985) [hereinafter Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality]
(discussing the historical development of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege). Attorney-client privilege
has become the foundation for confidentiality. Id. at 199. Attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary rule that
only protects confidential communications, and only applies to testimonial disclosures in judicial proceedings.
Id. On the other hand, confidentiality applies to both confidential communications and secrets, and applies to all
phases of legal representation. Id. at 199-200.
14. See Nancy J. Moore, Conference on Legal Ethics: "What Needs Fixing?": Lawyer Ethics Code
Drafting In the Twenty-First Century, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 926-27 (2002) [hereinafter What Needs Fixing]
(providing the historical evolution of ethics for lawyers in the U.S.). The first ABA model code of ethics, the
"Canons," were adopted in 1908 and were considered advisory by most courts. Id. at 925. In 1964, there was a
decision to review the Canons because they were viewed as incomplete, impractical to enforce, and not keeping
up with a complex legal society. Id. As a result, in 1969 the ABA adopted the Model Code in order to provide
discipline standards, interpretive guidance and inspirations to attorneys. Id. at 926; see Harry L. Subin, The
Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1106-09
(1985) (discussing the evolution of the rule against confidentiality from the initial passing reference in the
Canons to the Model Code which extended protection to communications beyond those initially part of the
attorney-client privilege).
15. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.12 (3d ed.
2001) [hereinafter HAZARD & HODES] (stating the unsatisfactory experience with the Model Code led to the
adoption of a commission to examine whether the Code should be modified or replaced); see also Robert W.
Meserve, Chair's Introduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, xi-xiii (American Bar Association 2002)
(1983), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/chairjintro.html (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (discussing the process of adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
16. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 15, § 1.13 (discussing the contents of the final revised draft of the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility).
17. Id. § 1.12; see also What Needs Fixing, supra note 14, at 926-27 (illustrating that The Model Rules
were essentially an abandonment of the Model Code). The Model Rules were both structurally different and
contained new content. Id.
18. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 15, at § 9.2; see also id. § 9.5 (illustrating the concerns lawyers had
with the future harm exception); id. §§ 9.19-9.20 (discussing that the exception was viewed as controversial by
the general public and the legal community).
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death or substantial bodily harm.' 9 The U.S. legal community was split on Rule
1.6, especially the portion concerning the exception permitting disclosure when
disclosure would prevent harm to third parties. 0 The split is a result of the
differing views that lawyers have regarding when it is appropriate to breach
confidentiality.2' Some attorneys believe that confidentiality should be absolute,
while other attorneys believe that limited circumstances should exist where the
need to breach confidentiality overrides the client's interest in privacy.
In 1997, the ABA established the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Ethics 2000") in order to consider these two contesting
views regarding if and when the duty of confidentiality should be breached.22
This commission recognized the movement among the states towards increased
disclosure, and revised Rule 1.6 to reflect the general consensus among the states
that the scope of the exceptions to confidentiality needed to be broadened.
Consequently, Rule 1.6 was revised, and the standards were relaxed. 24 This new
version relaxed the standard by eliminating two requirements under the previous
rule.25 First, there is no longer a requirement that the harm be imminent.26 Second,

19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983). The relevant language of the rule stated, "to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm." Id.
20. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 15, §§ 9.19-9.20 (discussing the controversy surrounding
disclosure of client confidences to prevent serious harm).
21. See infra notes 147-65 and accompanying text (providing the arguments of supporters and opponents
to a third party harm exception to confidentiality).
22. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 15, § 9.6 (providing that the ABA Model Rule on confidentiality was
the Model Rule most likely to be modified by the states); see E. Norman Veasey, Chair's Introduction to
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, xv-xvi (American Bar Association 2002) (2002), available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/e2k-chairintro.html (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (recognizing the
decision to modify the rules was a result of the growing disparity in state ethics codes). In addition, technology
had created new issues that had not been addressed in the 1983 Version of the Model Rules. Id.
23. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 15, § 9.20 (providing that a substantial majority of the states had
softened the requirements of Rule 1.6 and allowed for disclosure in a broader range of situations); see also
Ethics 2000: ABA House Debate on Model Rule Changes Start, ETHICS AND LAWYERING TODAY (Aug. 2001),
at http://www.ethicsandlawyering.com (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing the final
amendments proposed in 2000, which resulted in the modification of rule 1.6). The modification of Rule 1.6
passed by a mere six vote margin. Id. But see Lawrence J. Fox, Ethics 2000: Is It Good For The Clients?, 12
A.B.A. PROF. LAW. 17 (2001) (arguing that the modifications to Rule 1.6 in essence "abandon the client" and
are inconsistent with the level of protection clients are entitled to under the Model Rules).
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003) (stating "A lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation of the client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(Discussion Draft 2000), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6.html (providing the text of the Model Rule as
amended by the House of Delegates in their debate of the Ethics 2000 Commission report). This source also
illustrates the evolution of the rule, including the modifications prior to 2000, and the changes made in 2000. Id.
25.

Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L

CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2003).
26. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (1983) (stating disclosure permissible
only to prevent imminent death or substantial bodily harm) (emphasis added) with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2003) (stating disclosure permitted to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm) (emphasis added).
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the harm need not amount to criminal conduct. Under the previous version of
Rule 1.6, disclosure was permissible if the harm was imminent and the harm
would result in a potential criminal charge against the client. After the revision,
the harm is not required to be imminent, and a lawyer could appropriately breach
confidentiality if the harm was general to the public, yet not statutory criminal
conduct.
28
At the annual ABA meeting in August of 2003, a heated voting session
resulted in the ABA House of Delegates approving two additional third party
harm exceptions to Rule 1.6.29 First, an attorney can breach confidentiality in
order to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that can result in
substantial injury to a third party.30 Second, the Rule provides that confidentiality
can be breached to prevent, mitigate or rectify injury to financial or property
interests of another, which has resulted from the client's commission of a crime.3
The rationale behind the new exception is that if a client abuses the clientattorney relationship to the extent that he causes financial harm to others, then the
client forfeits the protection of the rule.32 However, due to the fact the financial
harm exception to confidentiality is extremely new, the effectiveness of the rule
has not been tested.33 Therefore, it is uncertain whether these exceptions, dealing
with financial harm, will be adopted by the individual statesi 4

27. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (stating a lawyer may reveal such
information necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminalact that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm) (emphasis added) with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R.1.6(b)(1) (2003) (stating a lawyer may reveal information necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm) (emphasis added).
28. See Profiles in Courage or Traitors to Core Values? Confidentiality: ABA Amends Model Rules,
ETHICS AND LAWYERING TODAY, (Sept. 2003), at http://www.ethicsandlawyering.com [hereinafter Profiles in
Courage] (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer) (discussing the background of the changes to the ABA
Model Rules). The actual vote count to adopt the financial harm exception was close, 218 to 201. Id.
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (2003), http://www.abanet. org/buslaw/
corporateresponsibility/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer) (providing the
full text of the amendments recommended by the ABA Corporate Responsibility Task Force); see also Kathleen
M. Ewins & George M. Kryder, eds, ABA Relaxes Confidentiality Rules (Aug. 8, 2003), e-newsletter received
Aug. 21, 2003 (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing the ramifications of the changes,
which permit lawyers to reveal confidences of corporate clients to persons outside the organization when
necessary to prevent substantial injury to others).
30.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2).
31.
Id. at 1.6(b)(3). The comments to the ABA model rule explain that this exception is necessary to
prevent a crime or fraud, which is reasonably certain to result in substantial financial or property injury to
another. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt 7.
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt 7.
33. See Profiles in Courage, supra note 28 (providing that the Amendments were recommended by the
ABA Corporate Responsibility Task Force, appointed in the wake of the corporate scandals that propelled the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
34. See Darrel W. Cole, DEL. LAW WKLY, May 7, 2003, at D I (discussing Delaware's decision to adopt
the substantial financial injury exception to confidentiality). Opponents of the rule believe that the lack of
guidance will result in uncertainty in the lawyer client relationship. Id.
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The Model Rules are ineffective on their own, but serve as model legislation
to the individual states.35 The Model Rules have successfully provided guidance
to states choosing to draft their own ethics codes, and some states were satisfied
with the ABA's drafting and chose to adopt the Model Rules as their own. In
2002, forty-two states had adopted some variation of the Model Rules.36
B. The U.S. Thresholdfor Breach of Confidentiality
Although somewhat adverse to the client's interest, the third-party harm
exception to confidentiality recognizes the value of physical integrity, human37
life, and recognizes that sometimes confidentiality may yield to public interest.
The rule itself attempts to guide the attorney in determining when a breach of
confidentiality is appropriate by expressly stating in the rule when disclosure is
permitted.3" According to the rule, confidentiality can be breached only when the
lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm.39 The rule provides little guidance 40 as to when harm is
"reasonably certain to occur". The comment to the rule states that harm is
"reasonably certain to occur" if imminent, or there is a present threat of
substantial harm at a later date if the lawyer does not take action.' Consequently,
this definition almost reverts the current version of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) to the
prior version. Although imminence is no longer explicitly stated as a condition

35. See Meserve, supra note 15 (noting that throughout the drafting process the Commission was aware
that the Model Rules would not be satisfactory to all legal professionals).
36. Id. A few states have elected to keep a modified version of the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, while some have modified the current version. Id. California recently adopted legislation that
allows lawyers to reveal confidentiality information relating to representation if the attorney believes the
disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
California Attorney Confidentiality Regime Loosened, ETHICS AND LAWYERING TODAY, (Oct. 2003), at
http://www.209.232.208.156:8080/ethics/Issues/1003.htm (last visited February 28, 2004) (copy on file with
The TransnationalLawyer). This change will take effect July 1, 2004. Id.
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt 6 (recognizing that although strict
confidentiality is best, occasionally the overriding value of life and physical integrity permits disclosure).
38.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2003).

39. Id.
40. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney's Duty to Report Profl Misconduct: A Roadmap for
Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 281 (2003) (discussing the ambiguities in Model Rule 8.3, which
governs the lawyer's duty to report professional misconduct). Rule 8.3 is ambiguous and interpretations vary on
what constitutes "knowledge" of a violation. Id. The language used in the rule makes it difficult for the
attorneys to know when they should be turning a fellow attorney into the board of conduct. Id. Rule 1.6 presents
a similar dilemma, as the rule is drafted in such broad language that an attorney is not sure when something is
reasonably necessary. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6. The rule provides an example of the latter portion
of the definition, harm that may be suffered if a lawyer fails to take action. Id. For example, "A lawyer who
knows a client has discharged waste into a town's water supply may reveal information to the authorities if
there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or
debilitating disease and the lawyer's disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of
victims." Id.
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precedent to breaching confidentiality, the definition of reasonably certain to
42
occur implies imminence. Thus, prior to breaching confidentiality, a lawyer
must believe that harm to a third person is not only likely to occur, but also that
that harm is imminent. 4' Besides the definitions in the rule, the only other
guidance for the attorney is a suggestion that it is appropriate for the lawyer to
consult other attorneys for advice."
Unfortunately, there is little case law examining whether a lawyer was
reasonable in breaching confidentiality. Furthermore, few courts have attempted
to establish factors or elements for an attorney to consider in determining the
appropriate time to breach confidentiality.
One of the few cases examining if an attorney properly breached
confidentiality is McClure v. Thompson.46 In McClure, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit evaluated whether the defendant's attorney inappropriately
breached confidentiality.47 Defendant McClure was arrested in connection with a
murder and the disappearance of two children. 48 After numerous meetings with
the defendant, the attorney had a strong belief that the children might be alive. 9
Despite the knowledge that he might be sanctioned by the State Bar Association
and Attorney General, ° the attorney called law enforcement officials, directing
them to the location where the children might be found." The children's bodies
were found, and within a short time the attorney withdrew from representation 2
42. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (comparing the language of the 1983 and 2002
version of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), with regards to the standard of breaching confidentiality).
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (defining harm reasonably certain to occur as
harm that will be suffered imminently).
44. See id. at cmt. 9 (stating a lawyer's confidentiality obligations does not prevent a lawyer from
securing advice about how to comply with the rules).
45. See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing an example of one situation
where the court was faced with determining whether an attorney reasonably believed he was preventing harm
when breaching confidentiality); see also State v. Hansen, 862 P.2d 117 (Wash. 1993) (holding that an
attorney's decision to alert the judge, prosecutor, and public defender that his client claimed there was a
conspiracy against him, and he was going to "get a gun and blow them all away" was appropriate). The Court
stated that there is a balancing of interests that must occur, and held that "attorneys as officers of the court, have
a duty to warn of true threats to harm a judge made by a client ... when the attorney has a reasonable belief that
such threats are real." Id. at 122.
46. McClure, 323 F.3d at 1238.
47. See id. (holding that the attorney did not inappropriately breach confidentiality when he released
information adverse to his client because the attorney reasonably believed it was necessary to prevent further
harm). Although McClure was an Oregon case, the Court referred to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
as well as the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility that was substantially similar to the Model Rule. Id.
at 1242.
48. Id. at 1235. McClure was found guilty of all three murders and sentenced to three consecutive life
sentences with 30-year minimums. Id. at 1236.
49. See id. at 1236-39 (discussing the contact that Mecca had with McClure that led to his belief that the
children were still alive.) For instance, during one interaction defendant McClure stated that "Satan killed
Carol," and when Mecca asked about the kids, McClure responded "Jesus saved the kids." Id. at 1237.
50. Id.
51. McClure, 323 F.3d at 1238.
52. Id. at 1235.
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The Court determined the attorney was reasonable in believing the children
were alive, and had acted under the well established exception of revealing
information to prevent the commitment of an act likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm. s" In applying this exception, the Court held that
the guiding rule for this exception is "objective reasonableness in light of the
surrounding circumstances. 54 Thus, in determining whether the breach was
appropriate the court stated they would examine whether the attorney "reasonably
believed" that the condition for disclosure existed and, whether, in coming to that
belief, the attorney acted reasonably.55 Accordingly, the standard adopted in this case
was a reasonableness standard.
The McClure decision adds little to the ABA's Model Rule interpretation of
when to breach confidentiality, since the Model Rule similarly refers to a
reasonableness standard. 6 McClure v. Thompson provides a thorough court
57
examination of whether an attorney appropriately breached confidentiality.
However, McClure does not establish an objective test for reasonableness; rather,
McClure provides an example of a reasonable decision by an attorney based on
the facts of a specific case." If the court decision laid out factors for an attorney
to use in determining the reasonableness of his belief, the decision would have
provided the needed interpretation of the Model Rule.5 9
C. Evidence in the United States that the Problem is Real

In 1993, Professor Leslie Levin conducted a survey of nearly 800 lawyers in
New Jersey, 6° requesting information on lawyers' experiences with clients who
53. Id. at 1242-43 (discussing the duty of confidentiality, the critical role it plays in the attorney client
relationship and the exceptions under both the Oregon Rule and Model Rule).
54. Id. at 1245. The court found that the attorney reasonably believed that revealing the children's
location would prevent the escalation of the crime from kidnapping to murder. Id. at 1246. The attorney was led
to the conclusion that the children were alive by the insistence of the defendant's family that the defendant
wouldn't the hurt children, as well as the defendant's continued withholding of information. Id. at 1247.
55. Id. at 1246.
56. See MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R.1.6(b)(1) (providing that confidentiality maybe breached
when an attorney reasonably believes that harm is reasonably certain to occur).
57. See generally McClure, 323 F.3d at 1233 (finding the attorney was reasonable based on the specific
facts of this case).
58. See id. at 1246-47 (providing a discussion of the specific factual findings the state and district court
made regarding the reasonableness of the belief). The circuit court stated that the ultimate question of
reasonableness of the attorneys belief is a question of law reviewed de novo, but great deference would be given
to the findings of the lower court. Id. at 1246. Furthermore, the circuit court stated that if deciding this as an
original matter, it might have been decided differently. Id. at 1247.
59. See id. at 1252 (Ferguson, dissenting) (rejecting the court's analysis of reasonableness). Judge
Ferguson believed that case law and rules of ethics required a number of factors to be considered under
reasonableness. Id. He suggested the court consider how much information the attorney had, how much
investigation the attorney conducted and whether the attorney was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the client was likely to harm a third party. Id.
60. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyers Response to Clients Who
Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 107 (discussing a study of New Jersey lawyers entitled "The
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tend to harm others. 6' Approximately nine out of every one hundred lawyers 6' had
encountered at least one occasion in which they reasonably believed a client was
going to commit a specific act that was likely to result in substantial harm or
death to an identifiable third party. 6 ' Nearly half of those lawyers encountered the
problem on more than one occasion. 6 In addition, about 20 percent of those who
encountered the problem identified the anticipated act as homicide.6 ' Further, an
66
additional 58 percent identified the act as assault or battery.
Of the lawyers who reported they encountered clients who they "reasonably
believed" were going to commit wrongful acts, almost 60 percent of the lawyers
formed these beliefs based on direct oral communication with the client. 67 A
number of attorneys acknowledged that they had clients who spoke about
committing future wrongful acts, but did not "reasonably believe" the client.68
Instead, these attorneys thought their clients were just having a bad day, and
some noted that the clients were asking hypothetical questions as to the result of
taking actions against a third party. 69 An attorney receiving the hypothetical
questions, would often respond strongly to the client's statements in order to
deter the client from making serious plans to commit these acts. 7°
New Jersey Study"). A mail survey was used to explore how attorneys respond when they believe a client may
be about to commit a wrongful act that is likely to result in substantial harm to others. Id. In the end, the total
number of surveys returned and used in the study was 776. Id. at n. 118.
61. Id. at 109-11 (discussing the survey design and survey respondents.) The survey was II pages long
and included 5 sections. Id. at 109. The first was demographic, the second asked generally about attorney-client
confidentiality. Id. The third and fourth inquired about actually dealings with clients who considered wrongful
acts resulting in harm to a third party. Id. The final section asked about the lawyers opinions on disclosure rules.
Id.
62. See id. at 111-12 (providing that 67 out of the 776 lawyers surveyed stated they had encountered at
least one occasion where they reasonably believed a client was going to commit harm to a third party). This is
about 8.6% of the test group. Id.
63. Id. at 112. Also, as Levin indicates, her survey was limited to avoid ambiguity, and the word
"identifiable" was actually included in the survey question. Id. at n.128. Some lawyers stated in the survey that
they routinely represent clients who they reasonably believe intend to commit serious crimes, but whose victim
is not identifiable. Id. As one lawyer indicated, most of his criminal practice deals with clients charged with
possession or sales of controlled substances. Id. The lawyers answer to how frequently he believes a client will
substantially harm a third party was none, due to the fact the requirement is'identifiable third party.' Id. He
remarked, "Ihave no idea of the identity of the next purchaser." Id.
64. Id. at 112. The actual percentage of those encountering the problem on more than one occasion was
47.8%. Id. at n.129.
65. Levin, supra note 60, at 112. The actual percentage is 19.4%. Id. at n. 130.
66. Id. at 112. Other anticipated acts included arson, kidnapping, driving while intoxicated and
terrorism. Id.
67. Id. at 115. The actual statistic is 59.7%. Id. at n.146.
68. Id.at 115.
69. Id. at 115-16. As a few lawyers noted, in family law practice there is a great amount of emotion and
frustration from the clients, and the lawyers have learned to take some of the 'talk' with a grain of salt. Id. at
n.149.
70. Levin, supra note 60, at 115-16. Additionally, most lawyers believed that they were personally
responsible for preventing the harm if a client, whom the lawyer reasonably believed was going to commit harm
to a third party, did not follow through and complete the act. Id. at 116. Most of the lawyers discussed the
consequences of the act, and about half discussed the probability that the client would be apprehended. Id. at
117-18.
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Overall, the study demonstrates that the problem of clients threatening to
harm third parties is real. In 1993, nine out of every one hundred lawyers faced a
problem client, and had to decide whether a potential threat was reasonably
certain to be carried out.7' Just as in the United States, attorneys in foreign nations
that recognize the third party harm exception to confidentiality, also face the
dilemma as to when breaching confidentiality is appropriate. An examination of
the law in various foreign jurisdictions will illustrate the different standards and
guidance provided to attorneys.

III. FOREIGN NATIONS
A. The CanadianStandard
72
Prior to 1999, ethical standards in Canada varied greatly on whether
confidentiality could be breached to prevent harm to a third party, as each
province in Canada had their own set of legal ethics to guide lawyers. A lawyer
had to look to the ethical rules of each jurisdiction to determine whether or not an
exception to confidentiality existed. The most expansive approach to
confidentiality exceptions was employed in New Brunswick. A lawyer had some
discretion to reveal confidences relating to crime or fraud, unless the client had
74
been charged with a criminal offense, making disclosure mandatory. On the
75
other hand, the province of Quebec had no future harm exception at all. Like the
American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar Association ("CBA") has their own
national code. The CBA's Code provides examples for the provinces, who then
adopt or modify the rules to their own liking. 76 According to the Supreme Court

71. Id.at 111-12.
72. See David Layton, The Public Safety Exception: Confusing Confidentiality, Privilege and Ethics, 6
CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 217, at 228-31 (2001) (providing examples of the ethical rules for attorneys from various
Canadian jurisdictions). Canada has a unitary legal profession, which means that all candidates called to the bar
and solicitors. Adam M. Dodek, Comparative Confidentiality: Lessons from Canada, 20
become both barristers
J. LEGAL PROF. 51, 52 (1995). Canadian lawyers use these descriptive terms to identify specialization within the
law field: litigators are known as barristers, while lawyers whose work does not usually involve courtroom
work are called solicitors. Id.
73. See Deborah MacNair, Legislative Drafters: A Discussion of Ethical Standards From a Canadian
Perspective, STATUTE L. REV. 2003.24(125), 2-3 (2003) (defining legal ethics as the compilation of ethical
principles that applies to lawyers). The body of rules referred to as legal ethics includes various sources,
including the CBA's Code, the rules of professional conduct of individual law societies, the decisions of
discipline committees and case law. Id. at 3.
74. Layton, supra note 72, at 229.
75. Id. at 230.
76. MacNair, supra note 73, at 3. Similar to the U.S. Model Rules, these rules have no legal effect
except where they have been adopted by the law society as part of their code of professional conduct. Meserve,
supranote 15. The CBA Code's general rule respecting confidentiality states, "The lawyer has a duty to hold in
strict confidence all information concerning the business and affairs of the client ... and shall not divulge such
information unless disclosure is expressly or by implication authorized by the client, required by law or
otherwise permitted by this Code." Canadian Bar Association, CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Chapter IV (1987).
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of Canada, the rules of professional conduct do not bind the courts, but reflect the
collective views of the legal profession."
In Smith v. Jones,7s a highly publicized case, the Canadian Supreme Court
finally faced the issue of whether the solicitor-client privilege" could be breached
in order to prevent future harm to members of the public.8 ° Jones,
the accused,
S
81
was arrested for aggravated assault for an attack on a prostitute. Jones' lawyer
sent him to the doctor, Smith, in order to prepare a defense. s2 During the
interview with the doctor, the defendant revealed his intentions to abduct and kill
other prostitutes. 83 The doctor, acting as an agent of the lawyer, went to the court
seeking a declaration to allow disclosure of this information 4 The court granted
8
the declaration and released the information."
The court concluded that when necessary, the solicitor-client privilege will
be balanced against compelling needs, such as safety to members of the public 6
Rarely is public interest so important that it will prevail over the privilege 7
Consequently, Smith essentially introduced the "third-party harm" exception to
confidentiality into the Canadian legal society as a whole. 8
77. See MacDonald Estate v. Martin [19901 3 SCR 1235, at 1254 (Can. 1990) (discussing in dicta that
the ethics are not binding on the courts); see MacNair, supra note 73, at 3 (discussing the composure of ethical
standards); see also Layton, supra note 72, at 228 (stating that rules of ethics are not binding on courts in cases
where common law and equitable notions of confidentiality are being applied).
78. Smith v. Jones, No. 26500,1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *1 (S.C.R. Mar. 25, 1999).
79. The solicitor-client privilege is the highest privilege recognized by the courts. Id. at 22. The court
stated that if a public safety exception applied to the solicitor-client privilege, it "would apply to all privileges
and duties of confidentiality." Id. Furthermore, the court stated that it is not necessary to consider any
distinctions that may exist between the solicitor-client privilege and a litigation privilege. Id.; see also Adam M.
Dodek, Doing Our Duty: The Casefor a Duty of Disclosure to Prevent Death or Serious Harm, 50 U.N.B.L.J.
215, 219 (2001) [hereinafter Doing Our Duty] (noting that the solicitor-client privilege has been expanded over
the last few decades and now largely overlaps with the lawyers duty of confidentiality set out in ethical rules).
80. See Smith, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *1 (holding that when public safety is involved and
death or serious bodily harm is imminent, the privilege should be set aside). The Court made this the mystery
case of the decade, by imposing a broad gag order on the case and allowing only minimal facts of the case to be
known. Adam M. Dodek, The Public Safety Exception to Solicitor-ClientPrivilege: Smith v. Jones, 34 U.B.C.
L. REV. 293, 293 (2000) (hereinafter Public Safety Exception). All the public knew was that the case was
regarding solicitor-client privilege, was from British Columbia and between "James Jones" and "John Smith."
Id.
81. Smith, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *18.
82. Id. at *18-19. Counsel advised the defendant that this interview with the psychiatrist was privileged
the same way that communications between counsel and the defendant were. Id. at 19.
83. Id. at *20.
84. See id. at *7-8 (finding communications between the accused and psychiatrist are made within the
solicitor-client relationship and therefore covered by the solicitor-client privilege). The doctor went to the court
because he had been retained by the accused, and it was against the interest of the client to release this
information. Id.
85. Id. at *21-22.
86. Id. at*41.
87. Id.
88. See Public Safety Exception, supra note 80, at 311 (discussing the nationalization of the duty of
confidentiality and the third party harm exception to confidentiality). Smith v. Jones resulted in a
nationalization of the public safety exception to confidentiality. Id. at 312. But see Doing Our Duty, supra note
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After recognizing the need for the public-safety exception to the lawyerclient relationship, the Supreme Court then faced the task of determining exactly
9
when it is appropriate to breach confidentiality. Accordingly, the court
developed a three-factor test to determine when public safety outweighs the
is
solicitor-client privilege. 9° The test to determine if the exception is applicable
9' In
whether a "clear, serious, and imminent threat to the public safety exists."
Smith, the Court found that there was a clear, serious, and imminent threat,
92
because: Jones had sufficiently detailed his plan; the crime of murder was
serious, 93 and; it was imminent, because Jones admitted to going to the area

where the prostitutes frequented.9'
In Smith, the court stated what facts an attorney could consider under each
prong and advised that a deficit of facts in one prong can be offset by strong facts
in another prong. 95 Furthermore, the Court recognized that the factors may
overlap, and the particular circumstances of a case will still need to be considered
96
in determining the appropriateness of breaching confidentiality. The three-factor
test established a framework for attorneys to use in analyzing situations where

97
there is a possibility of harm to a third party. Attorneys would now be able to

take the facts of each individual case and determine whether the threat to harm a
third party is sufficiently "clear, serious, and imminent" to permit a breach of
confidentiality."
First, the lawyer must determine if the threat is clear. In determining the
clarity of a threat, the lawyer must consider whether the threat is ascertainable
99
and directed at an identifiable person or group of persons. While there is no
each
79, at 219 (arguing that the Supreme Court decision supersedes the Law Societies ethical rules of
the
jurisdiction); see also Layton, supra note 72, at 243-48 (discussing the backlash and attempt to have
Association).
standard modified by the Canadian Criminal Law
the
89. See Smith, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *18 (stating that when public safety is involved
be
privilege should be set aside, but this case needs to determine what circumstances and factors should
considered).
90. Id.at *42.
91. Id.
92. Id.at *49.
at*51.
93. Id.
94. See Smith, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *53 (finding this was particularly significant since
bail).
staying away from the area where prostitutes could be found was a condition of his release on
of
Additionally, the Court stated that common sense would have made him aware of the consequences
Id.
bail.
of
breaching the condition
95. See id.at *43 (noting the factors may overlap and may vary in importance and significance in each
case).
96. Id.
97. Id. at *36 (stating the solicitor-client privilege should be set aside when public safety is involved and
death or serious harm is imminent). Additionally, the creation of a framework for breaching solicitor-client
privilege is evident by the way the court analyzed the opinion. Id.
98. See id. at *43 (stating that all factors must be considered, and as a general rule, if the privilege is to
be set aside it must be found that there is an imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death to an identifiable
person or group).
99. Smith, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *43-44.
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standard as to the exact specificity of the identification, the totality of the facts
will determine whether the threat is clear or not. '°° A threat to an identifiable and
large group of intended victims can be considered significant if the threat is clear
and forceful.'" In other cases, the lawyer may consider such things as: whether
there has been evidence of long range planning; whether there are prior acts that
are similar to the future threatened act; or whether the person has a history of
02

violence.
Second, the seriousness factor requires the victim be in grave danger of being
killed or suffering substantial and serious bodily harm.' 3 The Court stated that

the client's statement of intent to commit future non-violent crimes is an
insufficient reason to set aside the solicitor-client privilege for fears of public
safety.' ° This reiterates the Court's point that it is a rare circumstance to set aside
the privilege.' 5 For privilege to be set aside, the threat must be of the kind that
would cause serious bodily injury or death.' 6
Finally, for disclosure to be appropriate, the risk of serious bodily harm must
be imminent. '°7 The Court interpreted imminence to mean that the risk itself must
be serious, and the nature of the threat must create a sense of urgency.0 8 It is not
necessary to impose a specific time limit on the threat, because it will depend on
the other factors, such as clarity and seriousness, and whether all three factors

combined create a sense of urgency.'O°
As a result, in Canada, confidentiality will be set aside if, after carefully
balancing and weighing all the appropriate factors, it is determined that the threat

100. Id. at *44. In addition, the court stated that the necessary clarity of the threat will vary for each
individual case and the analysis is one based on the facts of the case. Id.
101. See id. (illustrating that a death threat to all single women in an apartment complex might be
sufficient enough to breach confidentiality depending on the combination of the other factors). Even if the target
group is large, considerable significance can be given if the identification of the group is clear and forceful. Id.
For example, a threat made in significant detail to kill or seriously injure all children under age five would have
to be given careful consideration. Id. Yet, a threat to kill all those that the client comes into contact with might
be too vague to invoke an exception to the privilege. Id. at *44-45.
102. See id. at *43 (providing examples of factors an attorney can take into consideration in determining
whether a threat is clear).
103. Id. at *45.
104. Smith, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *45-6.
105. Id. at *2 (stating that only in exceptional circumstances will the solicitor-client privilege yield).
106. See id. at *46 (noting that throughout the opinion "serious bodily harm or death" is the only
language used by the court to classify injury). The repetition of these words reiterates the degree of injury the
court requires prior to breaching confidentiality. Id. The Supreme Court also affirmed the notion that serious
psychological harm may constitute serious bodily harm. Id. at *46.; see also R. v. McCraw [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72,
81 (Can. 1991) (stating that so long as the psychological harm substantially interferes with the health or wellbeing of the person, it properly comes within the scope of "serious bodily harm").
107. Smith, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *46.
108. See id. (discussing that the context of the situation is important in determining urgency). The Court
states that if a reasonable bystander, after hearing the details of a threat, would believe the threat would be
carried out, the threat could be considered imminent. id. at *47.
109. Id. at *46 (explaining that a statement made in a fit of anger will usually not create the same sense
of imminence that a clear threat to kill someone when released from prison will carry).
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to the public outweighs the need for confidentiality.' However, the scope of
what may be disclosed is limited."' If the lawyer finds it is appropriate to breach
the solicitor-client privilege, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than
is necessary.' 2 This is similar to the standard in the United States, where a lawyer
may only disclose what is necessary to prevent the harm.
Unlike the United States and Canada, the European Union ("EU") is on the
opposite end of the spectrum with regards to confidentiality. The EU requires
3
absolute confidentiality in an attorney-client relationship." The EU does not
recognize any type of third party harm exception to confidentiality, and does not
seem to be moving towards one either.
B. The European Union Standard
The Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union
("CCBE"), created in 1960, is the officially recognized representative
organization for the legal profession in the European Economic Area and the
European Union. ' 4 The CCBE recognized that although the means of protection
5
vary, all its member states protect confidential information given to lawyers." In
Code
an attempt to create a more uniform system, the CCBE initially adopted a1988.'16
October
in
Code")
("the
Union
of Conduct for Lawyers in the European
The purpose of the Code was to obtain agreements on the principles applicable to

110. Id. at*48.
111. Id. (noting that the information disclosed should include what is necessary to protect public safety);
see also Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860, 891 (Can. 1982) (discussing that when it is necessary
to breach a fundamental right, the breach should be limited to what is strictly necessary).
112. See Smith, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. Lexis 46382, at *48-49 (explaining the importance of limited
disclosure). If a report contains references to criminal behavior that does not meet the imminent serious bodily
harm criteria, the other information should be purposefully deleted from the report before the report is
disclosed. Id.
113. See infra notes 113-133 and accompanying text (providing an analysis of the rule of confidentiality
governing the practice of lawyers in the European Union).
114. CCBE, What is the CCBE? (2002), available at http://www.ccbe.org/doc/En/leaflet-en.pdf (copy
on file with The TransnationalLawyer). The members of the CCBE include eighteen delegations comprised of
EU and EEA bars and law societies. Id.
115. See LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE, supra note 12, at 25 (discussing the Legal Professional
Privilege in various jurisdictions). For instance, in Belgium professional secrecy exists, and the secrecy has a
moral, disciplinary and legal basis. Id. at 26. In addition, in France, the duty is imposed by the legislation and
violation of the duty of professional secrecy is a criminal offense. Id. Further, the duty is almost absolute and
can be set aside for the lawyer's defense in criminal or civil matters. Id. In Scotland, confidentiality is so
important that only in special circumstances may a court require a solicitor to break the obligation of
confidentiality. Id. at 27. Lastly, in Spain the client does not have the right to release the lawyer from his
obligations, and a breach of the professional secrecy duty can result in a criminal fine, disciplinary penalty or a
long-term suspension from practice. Id.; see also THE EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 3, 14-19 (illustrating the
various ways countries regulate confidentiality); see generally LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 9.
116. See LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 10, at 21-22 (discussing the modifications, declarations
and concerns leading to the current version of the Code); see LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE, supra note 12,
at 25 n. 1 (discussing the historical adoption of the Code and the subsequent amendments).
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the practicing lawyer between EU member states,' 7 as well as to establish
principles acceptable to the legal professions of other non-member states in
Europe and elsewhere."8 The Code binds lawyers in EU member states who
participate in cross-border practice." 9
The general principles of confidentiality applicable to lawyers in the EU are
embodied in Article 2.3 of the Code.'2 The Code states a client has a
2
fundamental right to confidentiality, and without it, there cannot be trust.' '
Consequently, it is the lawyer's duty to respect confidentiality of all information
obtained in the course of his professional activity.'2 2 Furthermore, the Code
illustrates that the lawyer's obligation of professional secrecy and confidentiality
is absolute.'2 3 Like the U.S. Model Rule 1.6, the terms of Article 2.3 are
expressed in broad language and the Code offers little guidance as to the
24
application of the principles to the attorney-client relationship.
The CCBE stresses the importance of professional secrecy. 25 In 2003, the
CCBE President gave an address emphasizing the importance of professional
secrecy. President Kolrud stated that, "the administration of justice can work
only if clients can see lawyers in complete confidentiality.' 26 Democracy and
justice depend on the ability of citizens to trust lawyers completely.127 Furthermore,
the speech addressed the fact that lawyers are against the commission of crime, and
that anything a lawyer can do to combat it should be done, but not at the cost of

117. LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 9, at 21.
118. Id.at22.
119. Id. at 21. Cross-border practice is defined as "all professional contracts with lawyers of member
states other than [the lawyers] own; and the professional activities of the lawyer in a member state other than his
own, whether or not the lawyer is physically present at the moment." CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 2,
at Art. 1.5.
120. See CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 2, at Art. 2.3 (providing the general principles of
confidentiality applicable to cross-border practice).
121. CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 2, at Art. 2.3.1; see also CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra
note 2, at Art. 2.2 (emphasizing that relationships of trust can exist if personal honor, honesty and integrity are
beyond doubt). Furthermore, the CCBE Code requires that the personal virtues previously discussed are also
part of the professional obligation. CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 2, at Art. 2.2.
122. CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 2, at Art. 2.3.2.
123. See CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 2, at Art. 2.3 (providing the general principles of
confidentiality, and failing to include any exceptions where confidentiality can be breached); see also Former
CCBE President Helge Jakob Kolrud, Address at the Confdrence des Bitonniers 100th Anniversary, 2 (July 4,
2003) (transcript availableat www.ccbe.org/doc/En/speech_040703_en.pdf) [hereinafter CCBE Address] (copy
on file with The TransnationalLawyer) (emphasizing the importance of confidentiality to the lawyer-client
relationship).
124. See LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra 9, at 22-23 (discussing the broad principles enunciated in the
Code); see generally CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 1, (illustrating the broad terms with which the Code
was written).
125. CCBE Address, supra note 122, at 2. In discussing the recent worldwide interference with
professional secrecy, Kolrud referred to the EU money laundering directive, as well as the US Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, and how these acts change the role of lawyers. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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secrecy between a client and lawyer.' However, the CCBE acknowledges that some
countries have created exceptions to the confidentiality and reasonable arguments
could be made in favor of those exceptions. 9 The two exceptions the CCBE
acknowledged as reasonable included the client's ability to waive professional
secrecy, and the lawyer's ability to breach secrecy if human life or health is gravely
in danger.'30 Nevertheless, the CCBE view is that absolute secrecy is of the utmost
importance, and it is unlikely that the CCBE will agree with any new developments
or expanded exceptions to professional secrecy.'' The standard of absolute secrecy
has been rejected by most of the United States, because it is accepted that there are
situations where public interest overrides the client's right to confidentiality. 32
The Code requires absolute confidentiality from its lawyers. Therefore, when
the Code is applicable, a lawyer escapes the ethical dilemmas of whether or not
to breach confidentiality to prevent harm.'33 Unlike the EU's standard of strict
confidentiality, the legal profession in England has rules requiring both strict
confidentiality and exceptions to confidentiality.
31 4

C. The UnitedKingdom Standard'

In England, there are two distinct codes of conduct that govern the legal
profession. There is one code for barristers, and one code for solicitors.'3 6 In
Canada and the United States, the ability of a lawyer to breach confidentiality
depends on the jurisdiction where the lawyer is engaged in practice. However, in
England the distinction is based on the legal role of the actor in society.'37

128. Id.
129. Id.; see also THE EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (discussing recent developments in
professional secrecy).
130. Id.; see generally LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE, supra note 12 (providing examples of
jurisdictions that have exceptions to confidentiality that the CCBE recognizes as reasonable).
131. CCBE Address, supra note 122, at 2-3 (stating professional secrecy should be as absolute as
possible). President Kolrud further stated that he believed this "[N]ot for the good of lawyers, but for the good
of clients and the health of society overall." Id.
132. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6(b) (providing six situations where a lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client without the client's consent).
133. CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 2, at Art. 2.3.
134. There is a distinction between the confidentiality of client affairs and Legal Professional Privilege.
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE, supra note 12, at 4. The duty of confidentiality extends to all matters
communicated to a solicitor or barrister by a client. Id. Legal Professional Privilege (LPP) means that letters and
other communications between a party and a client are privileged from production in court, so long as they are
confidential and created for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice or assistance. Id. at 17. LPP extends
beyond the context of lawyers and litigation, and has been extended to non-litigious business. Id.; see also THE
EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing LPP and the importance of LPP in common law jurisdictions).
135. See generally THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE BAR, CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND
AND WALES (7th ed. 2000) (providing the regulations and codes that barristers are instructed to follow).
136. See generally THE LAW SOCIETY, THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS (1999)

(providing the regulations and codes that solicitors are intended to follow).
137. Compare CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES (providing the rules for
barristers to follow) with THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS (providing the rules that
solicitors are to follow).
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Barristers are special legal advisers and courtroom advocates trained to advise
clients on the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.'38 On the other hand,
solicitors offer legal services in a wide range of subjects and issues. 3 9 Solicitors
are available for activities traditionally thought of as activities requiring the help °
of a lawyer, such as buying a home, making a will, or setting up a business.'4
After contacting a solicitor,
the solicitor will discuss with the client whether there
4
is need to hire a barrister. '
The General Bar Council publishes a Code of Conduct that governs
barristers.' 42 The Code of Conduct provides that a barrister must preserve a
client's confidences to the strictest of standards and may not reveal information
to any third party without the client's consent or as permitted by law. 43 The
"permitted by law" exception is vague and no further guidance is given to assist
with interpretation. ' Under the Code of Conduct, confidentiality continues even
after the termination of relationship between counsel and client.'45 The rule states
that without prior consent of the client, or as permitted by law, the barrister
cannot reveal "information which has been entrusted to him in confidence.'

46

Furthermore, the Code of Conduct does not recognize a future harm exception,
and does not state that barristers are permitted to disclose information to prevent
foreseeable harm. 47 Consequently, unlike lawyers in the United States and
Canada, barristers do not have an opportunity to prevent harm to a third party.
England's solicitors are governed by The Law Society and their
independently published Guide to the Professional Conduct of Solicitors. 48 The
Guide for Solicitors recognizes the duty of confidentiality, just as the Code of
Conduct recognizes the duty of confidentiality for banisters.19 Although the

138. See THE BAR COUNCIL, About Barristers; What Barristers Do, http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/
document.asp?documentid=18 (Nov. 5, 2003) [hereinafter About Barristers] (copy on file with The
TransnationalLawyer) (discussing the role of barristers in the legal society).
139. See THE LAW SOCIETY, Your Guide to Using a Solicitor, at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk (last
visited Jan. 16, 2004) (discussing the basic reasons for choosing a solicitor).
140. Id.
141. See About Barristers,supra note 138, at http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/document.asp?documentid
=18 (stating that solicitors have good working relationships with barristers, and are likely to help a client find
the most suitable barrister to deal with the case).
142. See generally CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES (providing rules
and guidance
for barristers). The Bar Council is the regulatory and representative body for barristers in England and Wales. THE BAR
COUNCIL, Homepage, at http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/document.asp?documentid= &l anguageid= I&textid=214 1.
143. CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES, R. 702.
144. See CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES, R. 702 (stating the exceptions, and
not providing any interpretation of what is stated in the rule).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See generally THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS (providing solicitors with
conduct rules and guidance in solving ethical problems).
149. Compare CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES R. 702 (providing the
confidentiality rule guiding barristers) with THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS § 16.01
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Guide recognizes the duty to keep a client's confidences, in certain exceptional
circumstances, one can override this duty.'5 ° Note three to principle 16.02 of the
solicitors guide states, "A solicitor may reveal confidential information necessary
to the extent that he or she believes necessary to prevent the client or a third party
from committing a criminal act that the solicitor believes on reasonable grounds
is likely to result in serious bodily harm."' 5 ' This is the extent of the guidance
provided to a solicitor with regard to preventing harm to a third party. In
addition, a separate clause states the solicitor's duty to keep client's confidences
can be overridden in situations involving children, such as physical or sexual
abuse. 52 This exception covers situations where the solicitor learns from the
client of harm happening to a child, but the client refuses to permit disclosure.'53
Subsequently, the solicitor must decide whether the threat to the child's life or
health is serious enough to justify a breach of the duty of confidentiality.'5 4 In the
United States, the 'child exception' falls into the general provision of Model Rule
1.6(a), allowing for the prevention of reasonably certain death or bodily harm.
These jurisdictions have adopted exceptions that allow the prevention of harm to
children, even though there is still great debate among attorneys and scholars as
to whether breaching confidentiality is appropriate.
IV. THE DEBATE REGARDING DISCLOSURE

A. Arguments for a Third Party Harm Exception to Confidentiality
Supporters of disclosure believe that placing the lawyer in situations where
they must make moral judgments will help to promote lawyer morality. ' 5
Supporters believe that a rule permitting disclosure forces lawyers to confront the
issue of harm to others and realize their own morality and work in society's best
interests.' 6 In addition, lawyers are members of society, and have a duty to their
(providing the confidentiality rule guiding solicitors); see also LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE, supra note 12,
32 at 10 (providing the Law Society's view in 2002 regarding the importance of confidence and the legal
professional privilege in society).
150. THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS § 16.02 1 (stating the duty does not apply to
information acquired by a solicitor where he or she is being used by the client to facilitate the commission of a
crime of fraud, because that is not within the scope of a professional retainer).
151. THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS § 16.02 3.
152. THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS § 16.02 [4. For example, this might be a
situation where the child, who is the client, reveals information about sexual abuse but refuses to let the solicitor
disclose. Id.
4 (illustrating that this
153. See THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS § 16.02
exception also covers situations where the client is the adult and is either harming a child, or knows of a child
being harmed; however, the client refuses to let the solicitor disclose the information).
154. THE GUIDE TO THE PROF'L CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS § 16.02 4.
155. See Levin, supra note 60, at 101 (reasoning that "lawyers' attitudes about their role suffer when
confidentiality is required because it can distort the view of their own obligations 'as moral and autonomous
individuals').
156. Id. at 96.
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fellow members of the community." 7 Accordingly, the exception does not permit
lawyers to hide behind a wall of confidentiality and pretend that they are unaware
of the potential harm the client poses. 8 Disclosure supporters remain optimistic
that lawyers will attempt to dissuade their client from committing harm and will
rarely breach confidentiality.'59 Lawyers are aware of the consequences of

inappropriately breaching confidentiality and are reluctant to face these risks.'6°
However, if unsuccessful in dissuading the client, the lawyer should be free to
alert the intended victim or the authorities.16 ' Absent disclosure by the lawyer, no62
one else stands in a position to prevent the harm threatened by a client.'
Furthermore, although confidentiality is cited as necessary and fundamental to
the attorney-client relationship, the relationship survived for several hundreds of
years solely on the attorney-client privilege.' 63 Confidentiality is a relatively new
idea in some jurisdictions.' 64In jurisdictions where confidentiality has existed for
some time, the concept of confidentiality is evolving with the creation of new
exceptions.' 65 In addition, advocates of strict confidentiality often fail to

157. See Doing Our Duty, supra note 79, at 224-25 (arguing that lawyers have a duty to the state and
society; therefore, the lawyer should care for society which has entrusted the lawyer with a privileged place in
it); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (2003) (stating a lawyer is an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice).
158. See Roger C. Cramton & Lori. P. Knowles, ProfessionalSecrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v.
Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 101 (1998) [hereinafter Cramton & Knowles] (stating that a good
lawyer only has three options when a code of conduct prevents a lawyer from disclosing confidential
information in order to prevent criminal conduct, or conduct threatening serious harm). The attorney can
participate in the conduct, withdraw from representation if that is possible, or engage in disobedience of the
professional rules. Id. at 101.
159. Levin, supra note 60; see also id. at 116 (according to The New Jersey Study results, most lawyers
who reasonably believed their clients were going to commit a wrongful act attempted to dissuade their client);
see also Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 405 (1989) [hereinafter
Rethinking Confidentiality] (discussing that lawyer codes generally focus on the idea of attorney independence,
and most attorneys would rather maintain secrecy than break the norm and breach confidentiality).
160. See Cramton & Knowles supra note 158, at 117 (discussing the harm of a client's interests often
leads to unpaid fees, bitterness, and possible loss of reputation with other clients). Additionally, loyalty to the
client is of the utmost importance in the legal profession, and the profession condemns conduct that would be
considered betrayal of a client. Id. As a result, lawyers are unlikely to risk their professional reputation. Id.
161.

Levin, supra note 60, at 101.

162.

Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, supra note 13, at 210.

163. See Snyder, supra note 13, at 479-93 (discussing the history of the privilege, history of the ethical
rule of confidentiality, and the interaction of confidentiality and privilege); see also Limits To Attorney-Client
Confidentiality, supra note 12, at 198-203 (providing the history of attorney-client confidentiality, and the
differences between the evidentiary rule and confidential communications).
164. See Snyder, supra note 13, at 488 (noting that it was not until 1937 that the ABA unequivocally
stated that there was a duty to preserve a client's confidences). The 1937 version of the rule read, "It is the duty
of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. ld..
165. Id. at 490-93 (discussing the creation of exceptions to confidentiality in the U.S.). The Model Code
allowed three exceptions to confidentially without the consent of the client. Id. at 491. After the revision of the
Model Code criminal acts likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm were included as an
exception to confidentiality. Id. at 492. Most recently, the ABA approved the financial harm exception to
confidentiality. Profiles in Courage, supra note 28.
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recognize that there are other exceptions to attorney-client confidentiality' 66 and
the disclosure of information does not waive the client's claim of privilege in a

later proceeding. 6 ' Lastly, disclosure supporters believe that a person who
threatens to harm others becomes6 an aggressor and waives their protection of
privacy with respect to the threats.1 1
B. Arguments Against a Third PartyHarm Exception to Confidentiality
Opponents of disclosure argue that any exception to attorney-client privilege will
169
discourage trust in the attorney and undermine the attorney-client relationship.
Clients do not understand the limited situations when it would be appropriate for the
attorney Sto170breach confidentiality and may assume their situation falls under the
171

exceptions. As a result, clients could deliberately omit facts vital to their case.
Furthermore, knowing that confidentiality might be breached, the client will be more
reluctant to talk openly.'72 Proponents of strict confidentiality argue that lawyers acting
under a requirement of unqualified confidentiality have a better chance to get the most
information out of their client, and therefore can better serve their clients. 173 On the
other hand, some clients believe confidentiality requirements are absolute, or close to

166. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(5) (providing a lawyer can breach confidentiality to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil malpractice claim); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 1.6(b)(6) (stating a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation to comply with a
court order).
167. See Cramton & Knowles, supra note 158, at 121 (illustrating that a lawyer can work to save lives
by breaching confidentiality and warning of the harm, and is not required to testify against his client).
168. See Colloquium, What Does It Mean to PracticeLaw "In the Interests of Justice" In the TwentyFirst Century?: "In the Interests of Justice: Balancing Client Loyalty and The Public Good In the Twenty-First
Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1781 (2002) (arguing that a client who abuses the relationship of trust
gives the lawyer a strong motivation to breach confidentiality to prevent harm to a victim). The lawyer may feel
a moral obligation to tell the victim, or the lawyer may do it to protect himself from being accused of helping
and participating in the wrongful conduct. Id. at 1783.
169. See Levin, supra note 60, at 96-97 (discussing the theory that lawyers are essentially a client's
defender against the world, and therefore, allowing the lawyer to possibly turn against the client harms the
relationship). But see Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 158, at 388 (illustrating that 55% of people think
this exception would have no effect on public perception).
170. See Fred C. Zacharias, FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 357-60 (1994) [hereinafter
Federalizing Legal Ethics] (discussing how individuals watching television are exposed to the rules in one
jurisdiction, and may not be aware of jurisdictional differences for attorneys). Furthermore, those individuals
watching television may witness a situation when the lawyer legitimately breaches confidentiality, not knowing
that this breach is based on a limited exception. Id. This may create confusion and distrust. Id. at 361-62.
171. Id. at 360; see also Snyder, supra note 13, at 505 (emphasizing that clients will only benefit from
full confidentiality if they are aware of the confidentiality privilege).
172. See Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39
CATH. U.L. REV. 441 (1990) (discussing the need for lawyers to explain when confidentiality might be breached
to prevent deception and distrust in lawyers); see also Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 159, at 382-83
(analyzing how often attorneys informed clients of confidentiality).
173. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 15, at § 9.3 (discussing the social values of confidentiality and the
adversary system); see also Layton, supra note 72, at 225 (discussing that the flow of information from the
client is vital to the administration of justice).
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absolute. 7 4 These clients may have a false sense of security and may be misled into

saying things that they otherwise would not have disclosed, had they known their
confidentiality with the attorney would be breached.'75
Opponents of disclosure also tend to recognize and place great weight on the
differences between an attorney-client relationship and the psychotherapist-patient
relationship. 7 6 The psychotherapist-patient relationship focuses upon solving the
patient's mental health problems, whether that includes having the client committed to
a mental hospital, or working to eliminate violent tendencies. 77 Conversely, the
attorney-client relationship is focused on the client needing legal help, not an attorney
evaluating the clearness of threats and solving the client's emotional instability.' 8 In
addition, the psychotherapist has a greater degree of power to control the acts of a
patient, than an attorney to control the acts of a client. 79 Furthermore, a situation that
warrants disclosure does not necessarily prevent the physician from treating the patient.
An attorney presented with the same situation is likely to have to withdraw after
disclosing his client's confidences.'8 °
174. See Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 159, at 379 (describing a study in Tompkins County,
New York, where 105 lay people were surveyed, including 73 clients). 79.1% of the clients who were not told
of confidentiality directly by their lawyers claimed to know of this rule. Id. at 383. Furthermore, 42.4% of those
surveyed believed that confidentiality requirements were absolute. Id.; see also Levin, supra 60, at 103-07
(providing a general discussion of the Tompkins County Study and the empirical evidence indicating that
clients would be less willing to speak openly if they believed their lawyers would disclose information).
175. See Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 159, at 386 (finding that 11.3% of clients would
withhold information if the attorney told them that confidentiality existed except in unusual cases); see also
Levin, supra 60, at 104-07 (analyzing the Tompkins County Study and finding that lawyers overwhelmingly do
not tell clients about the rules of confidentiality); see also Pizzimenti, supra note 171, 476-81 (arguing that
there should be a duty imposed on lawyers to tell clients about the limits to confidentiality).
176. See Note, In Light of Reason and Experience: Against a Crime Fraud Exception to the
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 621, 635-39 (2002) (discussing the impacts of a harm
or crime exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, as opposed to the impacts in the attomey-client
relationship).
177. See Mark K. Sands, The Attorney's Duty To Warn Foreseeable Victims of a Client's Intended
Violent Assault, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 355, 7 (1986) (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer) (discussing
differences in the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient relationships and the duty to warn in professional
situations); see also People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal.3d 733, 773-74, 613 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr 738 (1981)
(holding psychotherapists' predictions of future violence are not reliable for determining if death is an
appropriate sentence).
178. Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality,supra note 13, at 209 (discussing how a lawyer's breach
of confidentiality frustrates his purpose, while not frustrating the physician's purpose); see also Symposium:
Law and Psychiatry Part II. Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff For
Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 236, 270-74 (1982) (providing an analysis of the divided loyalties
faced by a psychiatrist); see also Sands, supra note 177, at 8 (noting that the ability to control the client in an
attorney-client relationship is extremely different from the psychotherapist's ability to control the client).
179. See Sands, supra note 177, at 8 (noting that the psychotherapist has the ability to recommend
institutional commitments, where as an attorney does not have the same ability).
180. See Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, supra note 13, at 209 (discussing the potential
interference with effective representation that an attorneys concern for others could have); see also McClure v.
Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1247 (9th Cir. 2003) (illustrating a situation where the attorney was required to
withdraw solely because his concern that the children were alive). The court also wrestled with the client's
contention that a breach of confidentiality prevented the attorney from functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
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VI. THE NEED FOR A FACTOR SPECIFIC RULE PERMITTING DISCLOSURE
A.

The Need for DiscretionaryDisclosure

It is difficult to construct a per se rule to govern the actions of all attorneys in
determining when a breach of confidentiality is appropriate. Just as in most legal
situations, a case-by-case, fact-based analysis is the only way to solve the
problem. 8' Consequently, a discretionary rule permitting disclosure is the
appropriate standard to adopt. Discretionary disclosure allows for an analytical
and efficient case-by-case determination, resulting in proper service to the court,
the client and society.' 2 Under a discretionary disclosure rule, an attorney has the
opportunity to use his personal knowledge of the client's history and
temperament, combined with the client's statement regarding the intended harm,
to determine the possibility that harm will occur. 83 Under a rule of strict
confidentiality, the attorney does not have the opportunity to prevent harm to a
third party, rather he is sworn to secrecy. On the other hand, requiring disclosure
at any sign of harm is inappropriate, because it does not permit the lawyer to
consider the factors surrounding a client's statement.'" Accordingly, requiring
disclosure places the general society above the interests of the individual client,
and forces the attorney to disclose when it may not be justified. In a situation
where there is potential harm to a third party, discretionary disclosure permits the
attorney to consider a limited number of factors and determine whether breaching
confidentiality would be in the best interest of society and a third party.' 85

181. See Davalene Cooper, The Ethical Rules Lack Ethics: Tort Liability When a Lawyer Fails to Warn
A Third Party Of A Client's Threat to Cause Serious Physical Harm or Death, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 479, 520-21
(2000) (analyzing hypothetical situations where an attorney faced with the potential harm to a third party would
have to decide whether to breach confidentiality or not, and how each particular fact makes a difference in the
analysis of reasonableness). But see Subin, supra note 14, at 1175-76 (arguing that disclosure should be
mandatory to prevent serious harm, which would be defined as any conduct that would constitute a felony).
Subin offers two theories for this distinction: first, there is moral support for this distinction since felonies are
considered of great harm and condemned by society and second, the simplicity in such a rule. Id.
182. See Limor Zer-Gutman, Revising The Ethical Rules of Attorney-Client Confidentiality Towards A
New DiscretionaryRule, 45 LoY. L. REV. 669, 689 (1999) (noting the particular value that a discretionary rule
has in legal ethics). Discretion requires one to consider all of the relevant circumstances of each particular case.
Id. at 704. She further notes that the weighing of the interests should produce a decision that best serves the
purposes of the rule. Id.
183. See Levin, supra note 60 at 115-16 (illustrating that attorneys take into consideration whether the
client is letting off steam, or is just "sending up a trial balloon" before determining whether a threat is
reasonable); see also Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 705-06 (providing that a discretionary rule can be thought
of more as a contextual rule, similar to the negligent rule in the U.S. tort system). A discretionary rule is without
exact and detailed content, but is determined with the circumstances of each case. Id. at 706.
184. Levin, supra note 60, at 115-116.
185. See Cramton & Knowles, supra note 158, at 110-11 (favoring a permissive duty to warn rather than
a mandatory duty to warn because lawyers are more likely to support it).
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For the reasons discussed previously, the CCBE's 8 6 and General Bar
Council's 7 standard of strict confidentiality would not be beneficial or widely
accepted in the United States. Although both agencies believe the foundation of
the attorney-client relationship is confidentiality, the standard adopted in those
jurisdictions places the privacy of one person above the welfare of the rest of
society. As such, the United States does not need to revert back to strict
confidentiality, rather the United States needs to provide more effective guidance
to attorneys.1 88 One way to achieve more effective guidance is by adopting an
approach similar to that of Canada.
B. The Need for a Framework of Principles to be Considered

The United States needs a model rule that articulates when it is appropriate to
breach confidentiality to prevent harm to a third party. The ABA Model Rules
lack guidance for lawyers to determine when it is appropriate to breach
confidentiality.'8 9 An attorney presented for the first time with a client who may
harm others will not gain much by reading the rule to determine what the ABA
meant by "reasonably certain to occur."' 90 Consequently, the ABA's "reasonably

certain to occur" standard is ineffective and requires lawyers to define the
threshold for breach with their own vocabulary and experience. '9' The varying
definitions of reasonableness create distrust in the lawyer,192 as each individual
client will be concerned with what his individual attorney believes is the
definition of "reasonably certain to occur."'

93

A well drafted framework will help

186. See supra notes 113-33 and accompanying text (noting that lawyers in the European Union are
expected to maintain strict confidentiality with regards to their client's confidences).
187. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the expectation that
barristers maintain strict confidentiality).
188. See supra notes 36-44, 54-59 and accompanying text (illustrating that the U.S. Model Rules have
left it up to each attorney to determine what is 'reasonable').
189. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (discussing the guidelines available to U.S. attorneys
to aid in the decision to breach confidentiality).
190. See Zer-Gutman, supra note 182, at 711-12 (discussing the double objective standard of
reasonableness that a lawyer must comply with). From an objective standpoint, the analysis is whether a
reasonable lawyer under the same circumstances would have a reasonable belief that her client intends to harm
a third party. Id. As a result, the exception could apply even if the actual lawyer in the case lacks belief, but a
reasonable lawyer would have a belief of harm. Id. at 712.
191. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (providing little assistance in defining the terms
used in the rule).
192. See Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 170, at 371 (arguing public perception of lawyers might
improve if lawyers were subject to uniform ethical standards); see also Office of Lawyers Professional
Responsibility, Ethics Rules Differ for Lawyers in Minnesota and Wisconsin, THE MINN. LAW., Sept. 1, 2003
(discussing that in neighboring states the ethics rules regarding confidentiality vary significantly). For example,
in Minnesota an attorney has discretion to reveal information when a client intends to commit crime, but does
not allow for disclosure of a fraudulent act. Id. In contrast, Wisconsin's rule provides that an attorney shall
reveal confidential information to prevent substantial harm, or substantial financial interests to another. Id.
193. See Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 170, at 345 (discussing the justifications for unifying
ethical regulation); see also Cooper, supra note 181 at 519-21 (providing a hypothetical fact pattern where the
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94
to increase the public's trust in attorneys' and allow the public to understand
95
that attorneys have rules to follow.'

Canada's Supreme Court decision resulted in the most efficient and advanced
framework for an attorney to use in determining the appropriateness of breaching
confidentiality. 96 The Court's three-factor framework and requirement to analyze
all the factors is extremely helpful when attempting to make an informed
9
decision on whether to breach confidentiality.' The United States needs to adopt
a standard similar to that in Canada, where the attorney is given factors to
consider and use effectively. The United States would benefit from a rule similar
to Canada's because it would eliminate the uncertainty that presently exists in the
model rule.' 98 It is likely that a rule with sufficient guidance would appeal to more
99
states, and would help create a uniform standard in the United States.' In
addition, a rule similar to the Canadian rule still allows for analysis on a case-by2
case basis and offers guidance to the attorney. 0 This rule would consider
attorney applied the reasonableness standard). In the hypothetical situation, the attorney represented her client in
a bitter divorce case. Id. at 519. The client's statements regarding 'killing his wife' and 'that there would be a
funeral instead of a court hearing' triggered concern in the lawyer. Id. at 520. The lawyer recommend
counseling to her client, but failed to breach confidentiality. Id. A few days later, the husband killed his wife.
Id.. Based on the full facts presented, it appears the lawyer reasonably believed her client would harm his wife.
Id. Although this lawyer did not breach confidentiality, a different attorney presented with the same facts might
have determined there was a need to report the harm. Id.
194. See Sissela Bok, Can Lawyers Be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 918 (1990) (discussing that the
public has a problem trusting a practice that contributes to violence and deceit). But see Rethinking
Confidentiality, supra note 159, at 388 (illustrating that most laypersons believe that the public interest
exception would have no effect or decline public perception of attorneys).
195. See Bok, supra note 194, at 917-18 (discussing the element of secrecy present in government
agencies, organizations and businesses contribute to the distrust outsiders have of those entities).
196. See supra notes 92-95, 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing that an attorney must consider
whether the threat is clear, serious and imminent prior to the breach of confidentiality). But see Byron M.
Sheldrick, Administering Public Safety: Solicitor-Client Privilege, Medical Experts and the Adversarial
Process: Smith v. Jones, Int'l J. Evid. & Proof 4.2 (119) (2000) (arguing the standard adopted in Smith v. Jones
is a potentially dangerous precedent).
197. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text (discussing the factors to determine if breach is
appropriate in Canada, and the what the attorney should consider under each prong of the test).
198. See THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 2.03(3) (providing an
example of how the U.S. ABA rule should read). Rule 2.03(3) states disclosure is permitted, "[W]here a lawyer
believes upon reasonable grounds that there is an imminent risk to an identifiable person or group of death or
serious bodily harm ... the lawyer may disclose ... but shall not disclose more information than is required."
Id.
199. See Arthur D. Burger, Perils of Crossing States Lines: Complexity Abounds When Ethical Duties
Vary, Sometimes Greatly, by Jurisdiction, LEGAL TIMES, March 31, 2003, at 17 (discussing jurisdictional
differences and the impact on attorneys). For example, while most jurisdictions recognize the financial harm
exception to confidentiality, the District of Columbia rules recognize no such exception. Id.; see generally
Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 170 (discussing the need for Congress to create a national ethical
standard).
200. See Smith, [1999] S.C.R. LEXIS 46382 at *43 (providing examples of questions to help determine
the clarity of a threat based on the facts of a specific case). For example: Is there evidence of long range
planning? Has a method for the attack been suggested? Is there a prior history of violence? Are there prior
assaults or attacks similar to the one being planned? Is there is a history of violence? Is the violence directed to
an identifiable person? Id.
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criticisms of disclosure by allowing the attorney to evaluate whether his client is
having a bad day and just venting, or if the client is speaking seriously. ° ' In
addition, enumerated factors would help an attorney determine if the harm is
likely to occur and recognized by the public as sufficient to warrant breaching.
Illustrations and definitions with these factors would result in a clearer
understanding and a more efficient rule, which would preserve the sacred rule of
confidentiality.
VII. CONCLUSION

Lawyers will face conflicting ethical dilemmas regardless of whether there is
a rule recognizing or even permitting the breach of confidentiality. Although, a
well constructed rule will provide greater guidance for attorneys and will help to
minimize the dilemmas. A confidentiality rule allowing disclosure for third party
harm, which enumerates factors to consider in determining the urgency and
imminence of the threat, would supply the needed guidance. Adopting a rule that
states confidentiality could be breached if an attorney believes "that there is a
clear, imminent risk to an identifiable person or group, likely to result in death or
serious bodily harm" would take ambiguity out of the Model Rule. The attorney
would not be left to interpreting broad words such as "reasonableness" and would
remain effective to the client while still serving his duty to society. The United
States should follow Canada's lead in creating an articulate standard for
breaching confidentiality to prevent harm to a third party. If this occurs, it is
possible that other international jurisdictions will recognize the effectiveness of
this exception to confidentiality and this will encourage harmonization. An
effective rule will remove the conflicting dilemmas for lawyers, and allow them
to serve both society and their clients in the best way possible.

201.

Id.

